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E.O. 11652: GDS

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SUBJECT: SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

REF: A) STATE 167901 DTG 010215Z JUL 78 (NOTAL)

B) STATE 168320 DTG 031928Z JUL 78 (NOTAL)

1. (S) SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES:

SINGAPORE'S STRATEGIC LOCATION WHICH GIVES ACCESS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN AND TO OTHER AREAS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA MAKES THE REPUBLIC A COUNTRY OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES. US INTERESTS WHICH ARE SERVED BY A SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH SINGAPORE CAN BE CONDENSED INTO THREE SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES AS FOLLOWS. FIRST, THE US SEEKS TO PRESERVE THE CURRENT FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP WITH SINGAPORE UNDER WHICH IT ENJOYS ACCESS TO SINGAPORE'S MARITIME AND AIR FACILITIES. SHIPS OF THE US NAVY UTILIZE THESE FACILITIES FOR REPAIRS AND BUNKERING WHEN

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TRANSITING THE AREA AND US MILITARY AIRCRAFT ARE ALLOWED USE OF SINGAPORE'S AIRFIELDS TO SUPPORT VARIOUS REQUIREMENTS. CONTINUATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF THIS ACCESS IS CRITICAL IF THE US INTENDS TO MAINTAIN OR ENLARGE ITS PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, OR TO PROJECT ITSELF INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN. THE SECOND OBJECTIVE IS AN EXPANSION OF THE FIRST. HAVING ATTAINED A COMPATIBLE COUNTRY-TO-COUNTRY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND SINGAPORE, THE US SHOULD

PRESERVE AND EXPAND THAT RELATIONSHIP, SEEKING IN THE PROCESS TO DRAW A CLOSER IDENTIFICATION BETWEEN SINGAPORE'S GEO-POLITICAL GOALS AND THE GEO-POLITICAL GOALS OF THE WESTERN-ORIENTED COUNTRIES. IN TERMS OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY, SINGAPORE IS BASICALLY NON-ALIGNED. GIVEN ITS VULNERABILITY AS A SMALL CITY STATE, THE REPUBLIC'S WELL-BEING HINGES ON MAINTAINING FREE TRADE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES, LARGE AND SMALL, REGARDLESS OF IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION. WHILE OSTENSIBLY GIVING LIP SERVICE TO THIS EVEN-HANDEDNESS, IN THE ORIENTATION OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY, SINGAPORE NEVERTHELESS LEANS MUCH MORE TOWARDS THE WEST THAN TOWARDS THE COMMUNIST BLOC COUNTRIES AND IN PRACTICE IS DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE COMMUNISTS. IF, IN THE PROCESS OF CULTIVATING WESTERN INFLUENCE THE COMPETING INFLUENCE OF COMMUNIST BLOC COUNTRIES CAN BE NULLIFIED OR REDUCED, SO MUCH THE BETTER. THE AIM IS TO INSURE THAT TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE COUNTRIES CONTROLLING THIS IMPORTANT LINE OF COMMUNICATION LINKING THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE PACIFIC BASIN ARE EITHER FRIENDLY TO THE US AND THE WEST, OR AT LEAST HOLD VIEWS WHICH ARE NOT INIMICAL TO OURS. THE THIRD AND FINAL OBJECTIVE IS, LIKE THE FOREGOING, AN EXTENSION OF THE PRECEDING OBJECTIVE. HAVING ACHIEVED A FRIENDLY ATTITUDE WITH THIS TINY REPUBLIC SITTING ASTRIDE THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE, WE SHOULD ENDEAVOR TO UTILIZE OUR FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH SINGAPORE TO PROMOTE AND IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE LARGER ASEAN COMMUNITY AND THEREBY CONTRIBUTE TO THE REGIONAL THEME OF COOPERATION AND PEACE.

2. (S) THREAT ASSESSMENT:

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THREAT DEFINITION: SINGAPORE RECOGNIZES THREE POSSIBLE TYPES OF CONFLICTS WITH WHICH IT MAY BECOME INVOLVED. THESE ARE AGGRESSION BY VIETNAM, CONFLICT WITH ITS NEIGHBORS AND INSURGENT ACTIVITY IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA.

IN ANALYZING THE THREAT OF AGGRESSION FROM VIETNAM, SINGAPORE CONCLUDES THAT FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS THE LIKELIHOOD OF VIETNAM EMBARKING ON AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS IS REMOTE. THE POLITICAL ASSIMILATION OF THE SOUTH BY THE NORTH IS PROVING TO BE MORE DIFFICULT THAN THE NORTH ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED. THE LARGE NUMBERS OF FLEEING REFUGEES PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT THE ASSIMILATION OF SOUTHERNERS INTO THE AUSTERE REGIMENTED SYSTEM OF THE NORTH IS EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTIES. AT THE SAME TIME THE HANOI LEADERSHIP WILL HAVE TO DEVOTE THE BULK OF THEIR EFFORT AND RESOURCES TOWARD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY FOR YEARS IN ORDER TO ATTAIN THE ECONOMIC STRENGTH NECESSARY TO SUPPORT AN ASSERTIVE FOREIGN POLICY. IN THIS EFFORT THE SUPPORT OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES IS CRITICAL. THIS SUPPORT IS NOT LIKELY IF VIETNAM ASSUMED AN AGGRESSIVE ROLE. FINALLY, THE POSSIBILITY OF AROUSING CHINESE HOSTILITY INDUCES THE VIETNAMESE TO CAST LESS AMBITIOUS EYES TOWARDS SOUTHEAST ASIA THAN WOULD OTHERWISE BE EXPECTED. CHINA, DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF THE RUSSIANS, CONSIDERS THE VIETNAMESE AS SOVIET PROXIES. MOREOVER, CHINA MAY ALSO RE-

SERVE FOR ITSELF THE POSITION OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL POWER
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND MAY INTEND TO FILL THIS POSITION IN DUE COURSE.
WHATEVER THE RESTRAINTS UPON HANOI ARE, SINGAPORE DOES NOT SEE
THAT VIETNAM IS MOVING IN A HOSTILE MANNER TOWARDS SINGAPORE OR
ASEAN AS A WHOLE, AND THEREFORE ANTICIPATES A RESPITE OF AT LEAST
FIVE YEARS. THE POSSIBILITIES OF CONFLICT BETWEEN SINGAPORE AND
ITS NEIGHBORS HAVE LESSENED SINCE IT BECAME INDEPENDENT IN 1965.
THE PICTURE OF A PROSPEROUS BUT VIRTUALLY UNPROTECTED COUNTRY
WHICH WOULD HAVE INVITED A TAKE OVER BID HAS BEEN ELIMINATED BY
THE BUILD UP IN RECENT YEARS OF THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES. ASEAN
PROVIDES A FRAMEWORK FOR CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION WHICH LESSENS
THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPENLY HOSTILE DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN SINGAPORE,
MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA. ADDITIONALLY, POLITICAL STABILITY IN
BOTH MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA HAS LESSENED SINGAPORE'S FEARS OF
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SUDDEN CHANGES OF LEADERSHIP WHICH COULD INTRODUCE GOVERNMENTS
HOSTILE TO SINGAPORE. THE THREAT FROM THIS QUARTER IN THE NEXT
FIVE YEARS, AGAIN, IS CONSIDERED REMOTE. THE THREAT OF A COMMUNIST
INSURGENCY IN THE MALAYSIAN PENINSULA ESCALATING TO UNMANAGEABLE
PROPORTIONS IS THE MOST DIFFICULT TO ASSESS SINCE A NUMBER OF IM-
PONDERABLE FACTORS EXIST. FIRST, TO OFFER A VIABLE THREAT THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF MALAYA (CPM) FORCES WOULD REQUIRE

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EXTENSIVE ASSISTANCE FROM EXTERNAL COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OPERATING WITH SOME IMPUNITY THROUGH A WEAKENED SOUTHERN THAILAND. WHETHER THE SITUATION IN THAILAND WILL DETERIORATE TO THAT DEGREE IS UNKNOWN. ANOTHER FACTOR IS THE DELICATE ISSUE OF RACE RELATIONS IN MALAYSIA. THE GOVERNMENT BUMIPUTRA POLICY WHICH FAVORS THE ETHNIC MALAY HAS CREATED RESENTMENT AMONG MINORITIES WHO FEEL INJUSTLY TREATED. WHETHER AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES THE CPM CAN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS RESENTMENT IS NOT KNOWN. IN ANY CASE, TOO CLOSE AN IDENTIFICATION WITH THE CHINESE MINORITY HAS BEEN DETRIMENTAL TO THE CPM'S PAST ATTEMPTS TO ATTRACT A NATIONAL FOLLOWING. WHILE THE CPM HAS DEVELOPED EXTENSIVE UNDERGROUND POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN CERTAIN AREAS, THIS HAS NOT YET BEEN CONVERTED TO ITS MILITARY ADVANTAGE, AND VIOLENCE IN THE LAST TWO YEARS HAS NOT ESCALATED. SINGAPORE ESTIMATES THAT THE SITUATION WILL REMAIN MANAGEABLE SO LONG AS ECONOMIC GROWTH IN MALAYSIA CONTINUES AT THE GOOD RATES ACHIEVED IN PAST YEARS. RESENTMENT ALONE WILL NOT DRIVE MANY TO SUPPORT A COMMUNIST REVOLUTION BUT DESPERATION WILL.

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HOWEVER, DESPERATION IS NOT LIKELY TO SET IN AS LONG AS THERE IS CONTINUED ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT BY WHICH ALL GROUPS BENEFIT. FOR THESE REASONS SINGAPORE SEEMS CONFIDENT THAT IT WILL NOT BE INVOLVED IN ARMED CONFLICT OF ANY KIND FOR AT LEAST THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. BEYOND FIVE YEARS SINGAPORE FEELS THAT NO DEPENDABLE ASSESSMENT CAN BE MADE. DURING THIS INTERVENING PERIOD, SINGAPORE INTENDS TO IMPROVE ITS DEFENSES AND MILITARY FORCES NOT SO MUCH IN QUANTITY BUT IN QUALITY AND BETTER PERFORMANCE. UNFORTUNATELY, SINGAPORE FEELS THE RISKS OF DETERIORATION IN THE THREE ASEAN STATES THAILAND, MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA LOOK SOMEWHAT GREATER OVER THIS LONGER TIME SPAN. THEREFORE BY 1983 SINGAPORE FEELS THAT THE SOURCES OF POSSIBLE CONFLICT ARE NOT ONLY LIKELY TO REMAIN BUT MAY EVEN INTENSIFY.

3. (S) THREAT STRATEGY:

SINGAPORE'S STRATEGY TO COUNTER THESE THREATS HAS BEEN GEARED ALONG A GENERAL PURPOSE RESPONSE RATHER THAN ARTICULATED COUNTER-SCHEMES FOR EACH THREAT. BASIC TO SINGAPORE'S STRATEGY IS THE USE OF POLITICAL MEANS TO DIMINISH POTENTIAL MILITARY THREATS. GRADUAL NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM AND DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE RELATIONS WITH KAMPUCHEA, AS WELL AS STRENGTHENING POLITICAL AND PERSONAL TIES WITHIN ASEAN, ARE PART OF THIS STRATEGY. DOMESTICALLY THE GOVERNMENT HAS FOLLOWED A STRATEGY OF REMOVING SOURCES OF DISAFFECTION THROUGH A COMBINATION OF POSITIVE PROGRAMS TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF ITS PEOPLE AND FIRM MEASURES AGAINST

DISRUPTIVE ELEMENTS. SPECTRUM OF THREAT THAT SINGAPORE FEELS IT MUST BE PREPARED TO DEFEND AGAINST RANGES FROM LOW-INTENSITY INSURGENCY TO MODERATE-INTENSITY WARFARE EMPLOYING CONVENTIONAL LAND, SEA AND AIR FORCES EQUIPPED WITH MODERN WEAPONS. FOR SINGAPORE'S CURRENT LEADERSHIP STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS MAKE DEFENSE AND SECURITY INDIVISIBLE BETWEEN MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE. THE SPECTRE OF SINGAPORE'S SURRENDER IN 1942 HAUNTS THEM AND THEY ARE DETERMINED THAT THE LACK OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS WILL NEVER BE THE CAUSE OF

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ANY FUTURE UNDOING OF THE REPUBLIC. IN THE EVENT SUCH A SITUATION THREATENS, SINGAPORE IS PREPARED TO ORGANIZE A TOTAL DEFENSE OF ITS TERRITORIAL LIMITS EMPLOYING THE FULL RESOURCES OF ITS LAND, SEA AND AIR FORCES. RECOGNIZING THAT THE REPUBLIC'S SMALL SIZE AND APPARENT DEFENSELESSNESS COULD MAKE IT A TRAGET OF AGGRESSION, SINGAPORE'S DEFENSIVE STRATEGY IS TO FIRST, MAKE IT CLEAR TO ANY POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR THAT THE COST OF SEIZING SINGAPORE WILL BE UNPROFITABLY EXPENSIVE, AND SECOND, INSURE THAT ITS MILITARY FORCES ARE ADEQUATELY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED TO DEFEND THE REPUBLIC UNTIL ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF INTERCESSION BY OTHER COUNTRIES (HOPEFULLY THE US) BRINGS ABOUT A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. IN THE PAST, CONCERN HAS BEEN EXPRESSED THAT LONG STANDING CHINESE-MALAY COMMUNAL DIFFICULTIES WERE A MORE IMMEDIATE THREAT THAN THE INSURGENT SITUATION. BECAUSE INSURGENT COMMUNIST FORCES HAVE PRIMARILY BEEN ETHNIC CHINESE, THE CONFLICT HAS TENDED TO DIVIDE ITSELF ALONG ETHNIC LINES. PUNITIVE MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST INSURGENT FORCES IN MALAYSIA COULD, IF MANIPULATED, THREATEN TO INCITE RACIAL CONFLICT THROUGHOUT THE PENINSULA. BOTH THE MALAYSIAN AND SINGAPORE GOVERNMENTS ARE ACTIVELY WORKING TO REDUCE COMMUNAL TENSION, AND IN A SITUATION OF INCREASED INSURGENCY, BOTH GOVERNMENTS CAN BE EXPECTED TO MAKE CON- CERTED EFFORTS TO KEEP THE INSURGENCY FROM BECOMING CONFUSED WITH COMMUNAL DIFFERENCES. THE ISSUE, HOWEVER, IS MADE MORE COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE DEFENSE OF SINGAPORE IS ACCOMP- LISHED BY FIGHTING IN MALAYSIA. SINGAPORE IS PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE FORCES TO OPERATE IN COORDINATION WITH MALAYSIAN FORCES IN MALAYSIA, IF INVITED TO DO SO. IN EXTREMIS HOWEVER, WHEN ITS SURVIVAL IS CLEARLY IN JEOPARDY AND REASONABLE REACTION BY THE MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT SEEMS UNATTAINABLE, SINGAPORE WILL ACT, INVITED OR NOT.

4. (S) MISSION'S THREAT PERCEPTION:

THE MISSION'S PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT DOES NOT DIFFER GREATLY WITH THAT OF THE HOST COUNTRY. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VIEWS IS NOT IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE THREAT BUT RATHER THE TIMING. THE MISSION'S VIEWS ARE GENERALLY MORE OPTIMISTIC, ESTIMATING THE THREAT FROM VIETNAM TO BE MORE NEARLY EIGHT TO TEN YEARS AWAY AS COMPARED TO THE FIVE YEARS ESTIMATED BY SINGAPORE. SIMILARLY, THE THREAT FROM

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EITHER SINGAPORE'S NEIGHBORS OR FROM THE COMMUNIST INSURGENT MOVEMENTS APPEAR TO BE REMOTE FOR AT LEAST THE NEXT SEVEN TO EIGHT YEARS. THE MODERNIZATION OF SINGAPORE'S MILITARY FORCES OVER RECENT YEARS HAS EARNED FOR IT THE RESPECT OF ITS NEIGHBORS AND BARRING SOME UNFORSEEN CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT, ITS NEIGHBORS WOULD BE HIGHLY UNLIKELY TO EMBARK ON ANY MILITARY ADVENTURE AGAINST SINGAPORE. THE MISSION AGREES WITH SINGAPORE'S UNCERTAIN ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMUNIST INSURGENT SITUATION IN THE PENINSULA. NONETHELESS, THE MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT HAS DISPLAYED ITS FIRM CONTROL OF THE COMMUNIST INSURGENT SITUATION AND, GIVEN THE OVERWHELMING ENDORSEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF HUSSIEN ONN IN THE RECENT POLITICAL ELECTIONS, THE MISSION IS OPTIMISTIC THAT THE MALAYSIAN POLITICAL SITUATION WILL REMAIN STABLE BEYOND THE FIVE YEAR EXTENT THAT SINGAPORE LIMITS ITS FORECASTS. ALTHOUGH THE MISSION IS INCLINED TO AGREE WITH SINGAPORE'S CONCERNED ASSESSMENT ABOUT THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES UPON THE FRAGILE THAI GOVERNMENT, IT ALSO NOTES THAT

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SINGAPORE HAS TRADITIONALLY PREFERRED TO BE GUIDED BY THE PESSIMISTIC ESTIMATES OF A SITUATION, REASONING THAT IF PREPARED FOR THE "WORST CASE" AND EVENTS WORK OUT FOR THE BETTER,

THINGS ARE THAT MUCH MORE TO ITS ADVANTAGE. IN THE VIEW OF ITS LEADERS, SINGAPORE IS SMALL ISLAND REPUBLIC WITH NO NATURAL RESOURCES TO SPEAK OF, WHERE SURVIVAL OF THE COUNTRY DEPENDS UPON THE SKILLS AND BRAINS OF ITS POPULATION, AND THE MARGIN FOR ERROR IS QUITE NARROW. FOR A LARGE COUNTRY A MAJOR MISCALCULATION WOULD NOT MEAN ITS COLLAPSE BUT FOR A COUNTRY THE SIZE OF SINGAPORE THE RESULTS OF A MAJOR MISCALCULATION COULD BE FATAL. CONSEQUENTLY, IN ITS ANTICIPATION OF THE FUTURE, SINGAPORE MAY HOPE FOR THE BEST BUT BASES ITS CALCULATIONS ON THE WORST.

5. (C) TYPE OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT:

THE ARMED FORCES THAT SINGAPORE BELIEVES MEET ITS REQUIREMENTS ARE ESSENTIALLY THE ARMED FORCES IT HAS ORGANIZED NOW. THE BULK OF THE
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ARMED FORCES ARE COMPRISED OF GROUND FORCES - LIGHT INFANTRY AUGMENTED BY SOME MECHANIZED FORCES AND SUPPORTED BY LIGHT ARMOR AND SOME MORTARS AND MEDIUM ARTILLERY. THE AIR FORCE INCLUDES MODERN AIRCRAFT TO PERFORM AN AIR INTERDICTION AND A TACTICAL GROUND SUPPORT ROLE. RECENT TRANSPORT AND HELICOPTER ACQUISITIONS GIVE IT A TROOP LIFT CAPABILITY WHICH IS AS YET NOT FULLY DEVELOPED. THE NAVY, SMALLEST OF THE THREE SERVICES, HAS A SMALL ATTACK CAPABILITY PROVIDED BY MISSILE ATTACK BOATS (PTG), A PATROL CAPABILITY AND A MODEST TROOP LIFT CAPABILITY PROVIDED BY 4 OPERATIONAL LSTS. THE COUNTRY'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS ESSENTIALLY A NATIONAL SERVICE ARMED FORCES, COMPRISED PRIMARILY OF DRAFTEES SERVING THE REQUISITE 2 - 2 1/2 YEARS OF ACTIVE DUTY, AND CADRED BY A SMALLER CORPS OF PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL. WHILE MODERATELY WELL-EQUIPPED, MUCH OF WHAT SINGAPORE HAS EQUIPPED ITSELF WITH IS SECOND-HAND. THIS INCLUDES A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF ITS AIRCRAFT, THE LARGER VESSELS IN THE NAVY AND THE TANKS IN THE ARMY. THE EQUIPMENT NONETHELESS IS PREACTICAL AND FUNCTIONAL.

6. (S) ASSESSMENT OF THE FORCE:

THE FORCE DESCRIBED ABOVE FALLS WITHIN THE PARAMETERS OF A REASONABLE SIZE FORCE GIVEN THE DIMENSIONS AND URGENCY OF THE THREAT. THE NATIONAL SERVICE NATURE OF THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES GIVES THE NET EFFECT OF A YOUNG AND INEXPERIENCED ARMED FORCES. MODIFICATIONS IN THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE MOST PART ARE EVOLUTIONARY. NEW PURCHASES IN EQUIPMENT TO MODERNIZE THE FORCES ARE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED AND SUBJECT TO A MOST THOROUGH SCREENING FOR COST-EFFECTIVENESS. IN TERMS OF US INTERESTS AND ALTERNATIVES THE SAF ORGNIZATION IS APPROPRIATE IN SIZE, MISSION AND EQUIPMENT, GIVEN THE PRESENT COMPATIBILITY OF GOS AND US VIEWS.

7. (U) DEFENSE SPENDING:

THE TOTAL ALLOCATION FOR DEFENSE FOR FY78 IS US\$414.8 MILLION, A
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DECREASE OF 5.4 PERCENT FROM THE PRECEDING YEAR. THE DEFENSE BUDGET CONSTITUTES APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF THE NATIONAL BUDGET OF US\$2.5 BILLION AND IS THE SECOND HIGHEST ELEMENT OF BUDGET EXPENDITURE AFTER HOUSING. ASSUMING THAT SINGAPORE CAN SUSTAIN THE SAME 10 PERCENT GROWTH IN ITS GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT FOR 1978 THAT IT SUPPORTED IN 1977, SINGAPORE GNP COULD APPROXIMATE US\$7.1 BILLION. SINGAPORE'S DEFENSE BUDGET WOULD CONSTITUTE APPROXIMATELY 6 PERCENT OF THE GNP. MILITARY IMPORTS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO TOTAL APPROXIMATELY US-121 MILLION CONSTITUTE 1 PERCENT OF AN ESTIMATED US\$11.9 BILLION WORTH OF IMPORTS FOR FY78. SINGAPORE FOREIGN EXCHANGE STATUS IS BY SOUTHEAST ASIAN STANDARDS EXCELLENT WITH APPROXIMATELY US\$4 BILLION IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND GOLD RESERVES.

8. (S) POTENTIAL PURCHASES OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES:

A. F-5E ATTRITION AIRCRAFT: THE GOS WILL BEGIN RECEIVING THE FIRST OF 21 F-5E/F AIRCRAFT IN FEBRUARY 1979 WITH FINAL DELIVERIES EXPECTED IN OCTOBER 1979. GIVEN THE INEVITABLE LOSSES IN AIRCRAFT THAT ARE LIKELY TO OCCUR, AND THE LONG LEAD TIMES ASSOCIATED WITH AIRCRAFT PURCHASES, THE PURCHASE OF FOUR F-5E REPLACEMENT (ATTRITION) AIRCRAFT WOULD SEEM A REASONABLE EXPECTATION. THE PURCHASE, EXPECTED TO COST APPROXIMATELY US\$19.6 MILLION IN FY80, WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH CURRENT POLICIES WHICH ASSURE USG SUPPORT OF EXISTING INVENTORIES OF US PROCURED MATERIEL. THE ARMS CONTROL IMPACT OF THIS PURCHASE WOULD BE NEGLIGIBLE. THE AIRCRAFT IS ALREADY IN SERVICE WITH A NUMBER OF ASEAN COUNTRIES INCLUDING THAILAND AND MALAYSIA AND WILL ENTER INTO SERVICE IN INDONESIA IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

B. ANTI-SHIP MISSILE (ASM/SSM): AS A NATION WHOSE LIVELIHOOD DEPENDS UPON PROTECTION OF ITS MARITIME INTERESTS, SINGAPORE INTENDS TO MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE NAVAL AND AIR CAPABILITY TO SECURE ITS HARBOR AND THE SEA APPROACHES TO IT. SINGAPORE'S NAVAL MISSILE INVENTORY PRESENTLY CONSISTS OF THE ISRAELI GABRIEL MISSILE. OTHER COUNTRIES SUCH AS THAILAND, MALAYSIA AND BRUNEI ARE EQUIPPED WITH MORE MODERN EXOCET MISSILES. IF APPROVED, SINGAPORE'S PURCHASE OF THESE MISSILES WOULD PLACE IT ON AN EQUIVALENT LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGY WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. THE ANTI-SHIP MISSILE (ASM/SSM) WOULD BE EMPLOYED ABOARD NAVAL PATROL BOATS OR POSSIBLY ON AIRCRAFT WHICH SINGAPORE

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CURRENTLY HAS IN ITS INVENTORY. EITHER OR BOTH OF THESE MISSILE SYSTEMS COULD PROVE TO BE A VERY EFFECTIVE DETERRENT AGAINST SURFACE ATTACKS ON MARITIME SHIPPING IN OR AROUND SINGAPORE. THE PROPOSED ACQUISITION IN FY81 AND FY82 WOULD INVOLVE A MIX OF 100 MISSILES FOR AN ESTIMATED TOTAL COST OF US\$95.8 MILLION.

C. MAN-PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (MANPADS): ACQUISITION OF A GROUND-TO-AIR PORTABLE MISSILE SYSTEM WOULD PROVIDE IN A MODERATE

INTENSITY WAR DEPTH IN AIR DEFENSE WHICH IS OTHERWISE LACKING IN A HARD-TO-DEFEND POINT TARGET LIKE SINGAPORE. BY EQUIPING ITS GROUND FORCES WITH A CAPABILITY TO ENGAGE AND DESTROY MODERN HIGH-SPEED MILITARY AIRCRAFT, SINGAPORE WILL HAVE MADE A QUANTUM IMPROVEMENT IN THE CREDIBILITY OF ITS AIR DEFENSES. THE ACQUISITION OF APPROXIMATELY 200 MISSILES IN FY82 WOULD COST AN ESTIMATED US\$36.4 MILLION. ACQUISITION OF MANPADS WOULD NOT INTRODUCE NEW

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TECHNOLOGY INTO THE REGION. VIETNAM HAS EMPLOYED COMPARABLE WEAPONS IN THE LATTER STAGES OF THE VIETNAM WAR AND COULD LOGICALLY BE EXPECTED TO EMPLOY THEM IN ANY FUTURE CONFLICT. AMONG SINGAPORE'S NEIGHBORS HOWEVER, NEITHER MALAYSIA NOR INDONESIA IS EQUIPPED WITH THIS OR A COMPARABLE SYSTEM.

D. 155MM HOWITZERS M114A1: FOLLOWING AN EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF ITS ARTILLERY REQUIREMENTS IN WHICH THE RELATIVE MERITS OF VARIOUS CALIBER WEAPONS INCLUDING THE 105MM AND THE 155MM HOWITZERS WERE CONSIDERED, SINGAPORE HAS DETERMINED IT WILL ACQUIRE FROM FOREIGN SOURCES APPROXIMATELY 72 155MM HOWITZERS AS THE BASIS FOR ITS ARTILLERY REQUIREMENTS THROUGH THE 1980'S. IF SUCCESSFUL IN PURCHASING THE US VERSION OF A TOWED 155MM HOWITZER IN FY80, THE ESTIMATED TOTAL COST OF THIS ACQUISITION OF 72 HOWITZERS COULD AMOUNT TO US\$3.6 MILLION. THIS EQUIPMENT WILL LIKELY BE FORMED

INTO FOUR BATTALIONS AND MAY POSSIBLY DISPLACE ONE EXISTING OLDER MODEL 155MM HOWITZER BATTALION AND THREE BATTALIONS OF 120MM HEAVY MORTARS TO RESERVE STATUS. THE ACQUISITION OF THIS EQUIPMENT
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IS A LOGICAL REFINEMENT IN THE MATURATION OF SINGAPORE'S GROUND FORCES AND IF THE ACQUISITION IS INDEED INTENDED TO REPLACE OTHER WEAPONS, IS NOT EXCESS TO SINGAPORE'S LEGITIMATE DEFENSE NEEDS. THE PURCHASE OF 155MM HOWITZERS WOULD NOT INTRODUCE NEW TECHNOLOGY INTO THE REGION. WEAPONS OF THIS TYPE ARE EXTENSIVELY USED BY ALL ARMIES THROUGHOUT THE REGION. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROPOSED PURCHASE IS THE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN CAPABILITY OF SINGAPORE'S SUPPORTING ARTILLERY FIRES. THE RANGE OF SUPPORT WOULD BE IMPROVED FROM 8 KILOMETERS FOR THE MORTARS TO 14 KILOMETERS FOR THE HOWITZER. E. COUNTER-MORTAR AND COUNTER-BATTERY RADARS: ACQUISITION OF THESE RADARS WOULD ALLOW SINGAPORE TO IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS OF DEFENDING ITSELF AGAINST HOSTILE MORTAR AND ARTILLERY FIRE. BY THE DEFENSIVE NATURE OF THIS EQUIPMENT ACQUISITION BY SINGAPORE COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED THREATENING TO ANY OTHER COUNTRY. THE TECHNOLOGY OF SUCH SYSTEMS IS NOT NEW TO THE REGION. VARIOUS SYSTEMS WERE IN USE BY US AND VIETNAMESE FORCES IN VIETNAM. HOWEVER, DEPENDING ON THE SPECIFIC MODELS WHICH SINGAPORE MIGHT REQUEST, SOME TECHNOLOGY WHICH IS NEW TO THE REGION MAY BE INVOLVED. IF ACQUIRED IN FY80 THE TOTAL COST FOR A MIX OF TEN RADAR SETS COULD COST APPROXIMATELY US\$15.7 MILLION.

F. LIGHT OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS: IN WORKING TOWARDS AN EXPANDED CONCEPT OF JOINT GROUND AND AIR OPERATIONS INVOLVING EXTENSIVE USE OF HELICOPTERS, SINGAPORE IS CONSIDERING A PURCHASE OF APPROXIMATELY 30 LIGHT OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS FROM FOREIGN SOURCES IN FY80. AT THE PRESENT FORMULATIVE STAGE THE HELICOPTERS WHICH SEEM TO INTEREST SINGAPORE MOST ARE THE OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS FROM US (BELL OR HUGHES), FRANCE AND WEST GERMANY. SINGAPORE ENVISIONS A HELICOPTER AIRLIFT CAPABILITY FOR APPROXIMATELY 200 INFANTRY WHICH ARE PROVIDED COVERING SUPPORT BY HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS, (WHICH SINGAPORE DOES NOT YET POSSESS BUT HOPES TO CONVERT FROM SURPLUS UH-1B HELICOPTERS ACQUIRED FROM THE US). AT THIS TIME THEY PERCEIVE A NEED FOR LIGHT HELICOPTERS TO PROVIDE RECONNAISSANCE, FORWARD AIR CONTROL, DIRECTION OF ARTILLERY FIRE AND BATTLEFIELD OBSERVATION
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TO FIELD COMMANDERS. THE TECHNOLOGY INVOLVED IN THE PROPOSED ACQUISITION IS NOT NEW TO THE REGION. SEVERAL OF SINGAPORE'S ASEAN NEIGHBORS HAVE SUBSTANTIAL HELICOPTER-BORNE FORCES ALTHOUGH PERHAPS NOT AS MANY PROPORTIONATELY AS SINGAPORE WOULD IF THESE ARE ACQUIRED. THE TOTAL COST OF THIS PURCHASE IF MADE IN THE US IN FY80 WOULD APPROXIMATE US\$15 MILLION.

G. C-130B CARGO TRANSPORTS: SINGAPORE IS STILL SEARCHING WORLD-WIDE FOR TWO USED C-130B CARGO TRANSPORTS TO AUGMENT THE FOUR PREVIOUSLY ACQUIRED. ALTHOUGH OFFICIALLY INFORMED THAT THE US IS NOT AWARE OF ANY WHICH ARE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE, SINGAPORE HAS NONTHELESS KEPT UP A PERSISTENT SEARCH FOR A POTENTIAL BUY. SUCH AN ACQUISITION IF MADE IN FY80 WOULD COST APPROXIMATELY US\$10 MILLION INCLUDING SPARES. THE ACQUISITION SHOULD NOT AROUSE ANY OBJECTIONS ON THE BASIS OF OUR ARMS TRANSFER POLICY. SINGAPORE HAS A DEMONSTRABLE NEED TO SUPPORT ITS WIDELY DISPERSED OVERSEAS TRAINING PROGRAM AND THE AIRCRAFT IS EXTENSIVELY USED BY SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD.

H. EXPENDITURES IN OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE ARE EXPECTED TO BE IN PROPORTION TO THE US EQUIPMENT INVENTORIES SINGAPORE NOW POSSESSES OR CAN REASONABLY HOPE TO POSSESS IN THE FUTURE. AIRCRAFT SUPPORT (F-5E/F, C-130, UH-1, A-4) AND COMBAT VEHICLE SUPPORT (M113A1, V-200) CAN BE EXPECTED TO SHOW HIGHER TOTALS THAN OTHER SUPPORT COSTS. ARTILLERY MUNITIONS FORECASTS FOR FY-80-82 CAN BE EXPECTED TO REFLECT PURCHASES OF 155MM AMMUNITION CONTINGENT OF COURSE UPON SUCCESS IN PURCHASING THE HOWITZERS DURING THE SAME TIME FRAME. ANNUAL EXPENDITURES FOR THE BUDGET YEAR AND EACH OF THE TWO YEARS PROJECTED BEYOND THE BUDGET YEAR ARE US\$6.4 MILLION. I. TRAINING EXPENDITURES WOULD BE EXPECTED TO REFLECT A GRADUAL GOS INDEPENDENCE FROM US TRAINING, EXPECIALLY IN AVIATION. BEYOND FY80, SINGAPORE HOPES TO CONDUCT MOST ITS OWN TRAINING SCHOOLS, EXCEPT THOSE RELATING TO VERY TECHNICAL MATTERS FOR WHICH SINGAPORE DOES NOT INTEND TO ESTABLISH ITS OWN INSTRUCTION, OR THOSE PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT COURSES WHICH SINGAPORE FEELS MUST BE MONITORED IN ORDER TO REMAIN CURRENT.

9. (U) ECONOMIC IMPACT:

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THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED ACQUISITIONS IS EXPECTED TO BE MINOR. SINGAPORE'S ECONOMY, WHICH HAS PRODUCED THE SECOND HIGHEST ASIAN PER CAPITA INCOME STANDARD AFTER JAPAN, IS CAPABLE OF ABSORBING THE PROPOSED EXPENDITURES WITHOUT HARMING THE QUALITY OF THE COUNTRY'S SOCIAL OR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. IN VIEW OF SINGAPORE'S STRENGTH IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND GOLD RESERVES THIS ASPECT IS NOT CONSIDERED A LIMITING FACTOR.

10. (C) HUMAN RIGHTS:

SINGAPORE'S OVERALL HUMAN RIGHTS POSTURE IS A FAVORABLE ONE, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME DEFICIENCIES. IN PROVIDING FOR THE BASIC HUMAN NEEDS OF ITS POPULATION, SINGAPORE'S RECORD IS OUTSTANDING. UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION HAVE BEEN HELD TO LEVELS BELOW THOSE OF ANY OF THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES, WHILE THE PER CAPITA GNP HAS RISEN TO BE SECOND ONLY TO JAPAN IN ASIA. THE BENEFITS OF SINGAPORE'S HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL ECONOMIC POLICIES HAVE BEEN WIDELY DISSEMINATED TO THE PEOPLE: 60 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION LIVES IN WELL-DESIGNED SUBSIDIZED

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CNO WASHDC

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PUBLIC HOUSING, VIRTUALLY ALL CHILDREN OF SCHOOL AGE ARE IN SCHOOL, ADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE IS UNIVERSALLY AVAILABLE, AND PUBLIC HEALTH IS IN SOME RESPECTS SUPERIOR TO THAT IN THE UNITED STATES. A HIGHLY DEVELOPED SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM SETS ASIDE APPROXIMATELY THREE TIMES AS MUCH OF THE WORKER'S CURRENT EARNINGS TOWARD HIS FUTURE NEEDS AS IN THE UNITED STATES. WITH REGRD TO POLITICAL RIGHTS, SINGAPORE IS A PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN WHICH CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES ARE SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVED. ELECTIONS ARE HONEST, VOTING IS UNIVERSAL FOR ADULTS AND IS COMPULSORY. THE GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO ENJOY THE BROADEST POPULAR SUPPORT OF ANY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. ON THE DEBIT SIDE, THE RULING PARTY MAKES USE OF ITS GREATLY SUPERIOR RESOURCES AND ITS TOTAL CONTROL OF THE IMPLEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT TO OVERWHELM THE WEAK OPPOSITION PARTIES IN CAMPAIGNS. THERE ARE ALSO RECURRENT CASES OF ALLEGED HARRASSMENT OF INDIVIDUAL OPPOSITION LEADERS THROUGH VARIOUS LEGAL DEVICES.

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AS TO INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES, THE VAST MAJORITY OF SINGAPOREANS ENJOY DUE PROCESS EQUIVALENT TO THAT IN A WESTERN DEMOCRACY. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, LAWS WHICH PROVIDE FOR DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL IN CASES OF SUSPECTED COMMUNIST SUBVERSION AND CERTAIN CRIMINAL CASES (CRIMINAL SECRET SOCIETIES AND NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING). 10-12 RELATIVELY PROMINENT PERSONS HAVE BEEN HELD WITHOUT TRIAL FOR UP TO 15 YEARS ON GROUNDS OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND A SOMEWHAT LARGER NUMBER ARE HELD UNDER THE CRIMINAL DETENTION LAW. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONS AFFECTED BY THESE LAWS IS IN THE HUNDREDS, ALTHOUGH MOST OF THEM ARE SHORT-TERM DETAINEES.

THE UNITED STATES IS SEEKING ACTIVELY TO ENCOURAGE SINGAPORE TOWARD GREATER OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THOSE AREAS WE CONSIDER DEFICIENT. THE OUTLOOK OF THE SINGAPORE LEADERSHIP, ITS PRIDE IN ITS ACCOMPLISHMENTS, ITS SENSITIVITY TOWARD OUTSIDE PRESSURES AND ITS BROAD POPULAR SUPPORT COMBINE TO MAKE A REWARD-AND-PUNISHMENT TYPE OF APPROACH TO THIS OBJECTIVE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. A MORE SOPHISTICATED PROGRAM TO GAIN THE ENHANCED CONFIDENCE OF THE SINGAPORE LEADERSHIP, EASE ITS VERY REAL SECURITY CONCERNS, AND CONVINCE IT IN POSITIVE TERMS THAT IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE IS IN ITS OWN INTEREST, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS SHOWN PROMISE OF SUCCESS. OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM HAS AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN PROMOTING OUR HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES IN SINGAPORE. THE DOMINANT REASON FOR THE SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT'S CONTINUED RESORT TO DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL OF SUSPECTED COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVES IS ITS FEELING OF VULNERABILITY TO OUTSIDE ATTACK, EITHER OVERT OR THROUGH EXTERNALLY-DIRECTED SUBVERSION. IN MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR THE SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT TO OBTAIN (FOR CASH) MODERN WEAPONS TO DEFEND ITSELF, AND BY SHOWING THEM TO BE A RELIABLE SOURCE OF SUPPLY FOR SUCH WEAPONS, WE CONTRIBUTE TO THE GOVERNMENT'S ENHANCED CONFIDENCE IN ITS ABILITY TO PRESERVE ITS INDEPENDENCE AND ITS RELATIVELY FREE SOCIETY. DESPITE OUR FAILURE IN CERTAIN INSTANCES TO PROVIDE DEFENSE EQUIPMENT THAT THE SINGAPOREANS CONSIDERED IMPORTANT TO THEIR SECURITY, THE PROGRAM CLEARLY HAS

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MADE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION IN THIS REGARD. ITS EFFECT CAN BE SEEN IN THE DISTINCT IMPROVEMENT IN THE SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT'S PERFORMANCE OVER THE PAST YEAR IN THOSE AREAS WE CONSIDER DEFICIENT. FOR THE FUTURE, CONTINUED (AND PREFERABLY ENHANCED) RECEPTIVITY TO SINGAPORE'S REQUESTS FOR THE CASH PURCHASE OF DEFENSE EQUIPMENT AND REIMBURSABLE TRAINING OFFER THE BEST MEANS FOR UTILIZING THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO ADVANCE OUR HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES. WE SHOULD BE ESPECIALLY CAREFUL TO AVOID SENDING CONTRARY SIGNALS, WHICH COULD REKINDLE THE SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT'S SECURITY FEARS. NO PROBLEMS OF THIS NATURE AROSE IN THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE FIELD OVER THE PAST YEAR, ALTHOUGH THE HANDLING BY THE USG OF SEVERAL SMALL REQUESTS FOR THE PURCHASES OF POLICE EQUIPMENT BY CIVILIAN AGENCIES CAUSED MOMENTARY

CONCERN WHICH, FORTUNATELY, WAS RESOLVED BEFORE APPRECIABLE DAMAGE WAS DONE.

1. (C) MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES:

SINGAPORE RECEIVES APPROXIMATELY US\$500,000 OF GRANT ASSISTANCE FROM AUSTRALIA ANNUALLY. IN PREVIOUS YEARS THIS AMOUNT HAS BEEN EXPENDED IN THE TRAINING OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN AUSTRALIA.

12. (S) COUNTRY PROGRAM:

AS AN FMS CASH CUSTOMER, SINGAPORE'S SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY OF THE USUAL PROGRAM COMPONENTS SUCH AS GRANTS, IMET OR FINANCING CREDIT. AT ITS FY78 LEVEL OF US\$125.3 MILLION SINGAPORE'S SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS ESSENTIALLY A MAINTENANCE LEVEL PROGRAM TO SUPPORT ITS INVENTORY OF US ACQUIRED EQUIPMENT PLUS ITS MAJOR PURCHASE OF F-5E/F AIRCRAFT AND SURPLUS UH-1B HELICOPTERS. THE FOLLOWING IS A DEPICTION OF SINGAPORE'S FMS CASH PROGRAM FOR THE BUDGET YEAR FY80 AT THREE DIFFERENT LEVELS.

A. LEVEL 1 (MINIMUM LEVEL). AT THIS LEVEL SALES EQUIVALENT TO 11 PERCENT OF GOS REQUESTS FOR FMS PURCHASES FOR FY80 ARE APPROVED. AT THIS LEVEL SINGAPORE WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO MAKE CASH PURCHASES OF FOLLOW-ON SPARE PARTS, PUBLICATIONS AND TRAINING ESSENTIAL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PREVIOUSLY-ACQUIRED US MILITARY EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS. IT WOULD ALLOW FOR TRAINING COURSES WHICH SINGAPORE

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HAS TRADITIONALLY SENT PERSONNEL TO SUCH AS C&GSC COURSES. HOWEVER, THIS LEVEL DOES NOT ALLOW FOR CASH PURCHASES OF ANY NEW MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT OF HIGH-PRIORITY TO SINGAPORE SUCH AS ADDITIONAL C-130B TRANSPORTS, F-5E/F ATTRITION AIRCRAFT. COUNTER-MORTAR AND COUNTER-BATTERY RADAR SETS OR 155MM HOWITZERS. IN CONSTRAINING SINGAPORE PURCHASES AT THIS LEVEL, THE US MUST NECESSARILY TURN DOWN ANTICIPATED REQUESTS FOR PURCHASES WHICH ARE CONSIDERED VITAL BY SINGAPORE. IN ADDITION TO DAMAGING US-GOS RELATIONS, DECLINATION BY THE US COULD FORCE UPON SINGAPORE A REQUIREMENT TO PURGE US EQUIPMENT ON HAND AND TO CONSIDER ALTERNATE, MORE EXPENSIVE MILITARY EQUIPMENT, SERVICES AND TRAINING IN ORDER TO GAIN ASSURANCE OF DEPENDABLE SOURCES OF EQUIPMENT IN EVENT INVENTORIES HAVE TO BE EXPANDED. THE RISKS TO US OBJECTIVES COULD BE EXTENSIVE, INCLUDING THE LOSS OR RESTRICTION OF ACCESS TO MARITIME OR AIR FACILITIES OR BOTH. THERE COULD BE SOME LOSS IN OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE SINGAPORE'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES.

B. LEVEL 2 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL). AT THIS LEVEL SALES EQUIVALENT TO 57 PERCENT OF GOS REQUEST FOR FMS PURCHASES IN FY80 ARE APPROVED.

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THIS WOULD INCLUDE ALL SUPPORT ASSURANCE LISTED UNDER LEVEL 1 AND IN ADDITION APPROVE PURCHASE OF SOME BUT NOT ALL THE MAJOR ITEMS OF DEFENSE EQUIPMENT SOUGHT BY SINGAPORE. PURCHASE OF TWO ADDITIONAL C-130BS, FOUR F-5E/F ATTRITION AIRCRAFT AND 155MM HOWITZERS WOULD BE APPROVED BUT OTHER REQUESTS FOR MAJOR DEFENSE ITEMS WOULD BE DECLINED. BY APPROVING THE MOST CRITICAL OF GOS DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS, THE US WOULD AVERT MUCH OF THE FRUSTRATION AND ILL WILL EXPECTED UNDER LEVEL 1. OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE SINGAPORE'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES WOULD BE SOMEWHAT IMPROVED OVER THAT OF LEVEL 1.

C. LEVEL 3 (CURRENT LEVEL). AT THIS LEVEL SALES EQUIVALENT TO 100 PERCENT OF GOS REQUESTS FOR FMS PURCHASES IN FY80 ARE APPROVED. THIS WOULD INCLUDE ALL SUPPORT ASSURANCES LISTED UNDER LEVEL 1 AND IN ADDITION APPROVE THE PURCHASES OF ALL MAJOR ITEMS OF DEFENSE EQUIPMENT SOUGHT BY SINGAPORE. THE PURCHASE OF TWO ADDITIONAL C-130BS, FOUR F-5E/F ATTRITION AIRCRAFT, COUTERFIRE
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RADAR, 155MM ARTILLERY AND OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS WOULD BE APPROVED. OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE SINGAPORE'S MUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES WOULD BE ENHANCED.

13. (U) DAO MANING LEVEL:

DAO AUGMENTATION FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE TOTALS ONE MILITARY SPACE,
GRADE E-7 AND ONE CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE (US), GRADE GS-3. UNDER ALL
THREE PROGRAM LEVELS PROJECTED ABOVE, THIS MINIMUM MANNING LEVEL
WOULD REMAIN CONSTANT.

14. (S) PROJECTIONS FOR FY80-82:

ESTIMATED PROGRAM REQUIREMENT FOR FY80-82 ARE PROJECTED AS INDICATED.
ALL ARE LEVELS OF FMS CASH PURCHASES FOR WHICH THE MISSION WOULD
RECOMMEND SUPPORT:

ITEM	FY80	FY81	FY82
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INVESTMENT	63.9	68.5	61.5
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OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE	6.4	6.4	6.4
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TRAINING	1.8	1.5	1.0
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TOTAL	72.1	76.4	68.9
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